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Abstract
This note develops a dynamic model of crime that determines the conditions under which it is
optimal for a criminal to delay commission of a crime rather than committing it immediately.
It also examines the optimal enforcement strategy in this context. We derive two results. The
first is that it might be optimal to postpone a crime that is profitable now if its benefit
increase quickly enough in the future and that a crime that is not yet optimal might become
so in the future. The second is that it is optimal to underdeter crime.
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11. Introduction
This note considers a potential criminal contemplating committing a crime. Individ-
uals have to decide whether they commit the crime now or later. The aim of the paper
is to answer the following problem: at what point it is optimal to commit a crime and
which are the consequences for the enforcement authority? We employ a model in which
individuals may postpone the crime. Individuals commit the crime once.
There are other dynamic models of crime, but we depart from them in the sense that
they consider repeat oﬀenses. The papers (Davis, 1988; Polinsky and Shavell, 1998; Baik
and Kim, 2001; Emons, 2003 and 2004) ask the question whether the decreasing sanction
scheme maximizes social welfare. Agents may commit the crime several times. The closer
paper to ours is Engelen (2004). He establishes an analogy between real option and
criminal behavior and applies it to restricting illegal insider trading. He concludes that it
may then be optimal to wait some time before committing the crime.
Our results invalidate the simple net expected payoﬀ rule as it is commonly shown in
the economic theory of criminal behavior (for surveys, see Polinsky and Shavell, 2000 and
Garoupa, 1997). Because previous models ignore the ability of postpone the crime, they
miss the possibility for the authority to induce individuals to commit the crime earlier
or later in order to maximize the social welfare. Our framework is a richer model than
the conventional analysis of crime, which is a special case of our model. We show that it
m i g h tb eo p t i m a lt op o s t p o n eac r i m et h a ti sp r o ﬁtable now if its beneﬁti n c r e a s eq u i c k l y
enough in the future. We also show that a crime that is not yet optimal might become
so in the future. In this framework, we show that some under deterrence is optimal.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives the individual’s decision of whether
and when to commit the crime. Section 4 derives some enforcement policy implications.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2. The Model
In the model, risk neutral individuals contemplate whether to commit a crime im-
mediately or later. Each individual is identiﬁed by the beneﬁt he would obtain from
committing the oﬀense, b ∈ [0,B]. The crime causes harm, h.W es u p p o s et h a th<B ,
that is, not every oﬀense is socially undesirable. We consider a model with an inﬁnite
number of periods t =0 ,1,... and continuous discount rate ρ.
At t =0 , individuals must decide whether to commit the crime immediately or later.
Individuals who commit the crime are detected with some probability, p,a n dﬁned, f.
So, the game ends. If individuals decide to wait, then the beneﬁt increases at the rate α,
i.e. it becomes be(α−ρ)t. Let us gives some examples of crimes that change in value over
time. Taxpayers may wait that their earnings become high to "forget" a source of income
in their declaration. Thieves may wait that the safe deposit makes full before assaulting
it. Managers may wait that free cash ﬂow increases before diverting it. You can also
think about insider trading case (see Engelen (2004) for a more detailed analysis). The
insider possesses a non public information about a ﬁrm that can inﬂuence the price of
a security. He can commit the crime immediately, i.e. trade on this inside information
2before the information becomes public and the stock price changes. But it can be valuable
to postpone the trade even if it is proﬁtable immediately. For instance, the insider can
wait until liquidity is high enough since as liquidity increases his gain increases. Or he
can wait to collect more information, which will increase the potential gains of the crime.
Ac r i m ei sd e ﬁned by the beneﬁt it provides and the harm it causes. Harm and beneﬁt
are related. Consequently when the beneﬁt increases, the harm increases. The harm done
increases throughout time at the rate γ. In order to derive some tractable results we
assume that γ<ρ .
We consider ﬁrst the decision of individuals whether to commit the crime immediately
or later. Clearly, individuals’ strategies are the following. First, individuals can decide
n o tt oc o m m i tt h ec r i m e .T h ee x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ is zero. Second, individuals can decide to
commit the crime at t =0 .I nt h a tc a s e ,t h ee x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ is:
F
0 = b − pf (1)






Remark that when α>ρ , waiting longer to commit the crime would always be a
better policy and the optimum would not exist. Consequently, from now on we consider
t h ec a s ew h e nα<ρ . There will be a critical beneﬁt above which individuals will commit
the crime immediately and below which they commit the crime later. The critical beneﬁt
is deﬁned by the probability of detection, the level of sanction and the growth rates.
Proposition 1 Deﬁne b =
ρ
ρ−αpf.















, individuals commit the crime at t =0 .
Proof. The value of the crime opportunity assuming he commits the crime at some
arbitrary future time T is FT = be(α−ρ)T−pfe−ρT. Maximizing FT with respect to T gives
the following ﬁrst order condition (the second order condition is satisﬁed) which implies










.W eh a v eT∗ =0for
ρpf
(ρ−α)b ≤ 1 which gives b =
ρ
ρ−αpf.
First, if the beneﬁt is superior to the critical beneﬁt b,t h e ni ti so p t i m a lt oc o m m i tt h e
crime immediately since the beneﬁt of waiting is less than its cost because of discounting.
Second, if the beneﬁt is inferior to the critical beneﬁt b, then individuals must wait to
increase their beneﬁt enough. Actually, the discounted beneﬁt increases at a factor e(α−ρ)t,
whereas the discounted expected punishment increases by a smaller factor e−ρt.I no t h e r
terms, there are situations in which it is pref e r a b l et od e l a yt h ec r i m ea n dt h i se v e ni ft h e
gain from doing so exceeds the expected punishment in the ﬁrst period.
3L e tu sn o wt u r nt ot h ee n f o r c e m e n tp r o b l e m .T h ee n f o r c e m e n ta u t h o r i t y ’ sa i mi st o
maximize social welfare through the choice of the ﬁne for the crime, f.T h e s a n c t i o n
is monetary and socially costless to impose. Social welfare is the sum of the beneﬁts
obtained by individuals less the harm done. The level of the ﬁne does not aﬀect social
welfare directly because we assume that ﬁnes are socially costless to impose.













(b − h)g(b)db (3)
The ﬁrst term is the impact on social welfare of those individuals who decide to wait.
The second term is that of those individuals who choose to commit a crime at t =0 .N o t e
that ﬁnes being pure monetary transfers, their level f does not enter the social welfare
impact of any given individual. However, it aﬀects social welfare through its impact on
the threshold b. That is, the level of ﬁnes aﬀects the individuals’ behavior.
The optimal enforcement policy is deﬁned in the following proposition:







.S o m ed e g r e eo fu n d e r d e t e r -
rence is optimally desirable.
Proof. Maximizing the social welfare over f gives the optimal ﬁne. Knowing that T∗
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and g(b) does not depend

























The intuition is the following. The optimal sanction depends only on the parameters
that deﬁne the social costs (h, γ, ρ and α through T∗ and ¯ b). Suppose that T∗ =0
then we ﬁnd the standard result f∗ = h
p, i.e. perfect deterrence. The optimal sanction
4ensures that the criminals internalize the social costs they cause. If the crime in the
future becomes valuable T∗ > 0, this implies that the social costs are increasing and so
the authority has to change the optimal sanction. If the authority increases the optimal
sanction then it induces the criminals to postpone their crime, which in turn increases
the social costs. At the opposite decreasing the optimal sanction induces the criminals
to act earlier and so, decreases the social costs. Since ﬁnes are pure monetary transfers,
it becomes optimal to urge some crimes by undertaking underdeterrence. This involves
leaving some positive gains from crime. This underdeterrence result holds for all possible
values of the parameters α and γ1.
Numerical example: take the following parameters’ values B =1 , h =0 .55, ρ =0 .1,
α =0 .05, γ =0 .06 and p =0 .5. In this case, the criminal delays his crime for b<0.733.
The ﬁne which ensures perfect deterrence is f = h
p =1 .1. The following graphic shows
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¯ b bdb and the tick
line represents the social welfare.
3. Conclusion
1Assuming that α and/or γ can be diﬀerent in some periods would not aﬀect qualitatively our results.
For example, in the periods in which the crime is more attractive (higher α), then the social costs is
higher and so, the expected optimal sanction has tob el e s s e rt ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h e s ep e r i o d s .
5This paper develops a dynamic model of crime that determines the conditions under
which it is optimal for a criminal to delay commission of a crime rather than committing
it immediately. It also examines the optimal enforcement strategy in this context. The
paper derives two main results. The ﬁrst is the fairly obvious result that it may be optimal
to wait even if committing the crime now would yield a positive net expected beneﬁt. The
second is that enforcers should under-deter crime to induce oﬀenders to commit crimes now
rather than later. Note that when authorities have two policy instruments to maximize
social welfare: the enforcement expenditures to detect oﬀender and the ﬁne, we ﬁnd the
well-known result from static models of crime: underdeterrence is greater.
Further understanding of how and why the net beneﬁt from crime increases over time
may aim at describing the behavior of potential criminal. We suspect that information
acquisition may be an important explanation. In this way, we could introduce the pos-
sibility of learning of beneﬁt or the probability of detection between the periods. For
example, individuals might obtain information about the actual value of the probabil-
ity of detection by investigating and spending time to determine the actual number of
cameras’ monitoring, guards,...
Another natural extension is to consider a setup where individuals can commit repeat
oﬀenses.
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